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A INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I compare two models of constitutionalism. The first model can be
associated with the main tradition of American constitutionalism, at least since
Chief Justice Marshall’s reasoning in Marbury v Madison.1 I shall characterize it as
the ‘American’ or ‘Marshallian’ model. The second model can be associated with
the main tradition of British constitutionalism, at least since Albert V Dicey’s
theory expounded in his Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution.2 I shall
characterize it as the ‘British’ or ‘Diceyan’ model.3 The distinction I wish to
emphasize is the following: while the first model entails that the basic rules and
principles of constitutional law should be conceived as the source of (what should be
accepted as) legitimate governmental action and decision, the second model
entails that they should be conceived as the consequence of (what should be accepted
as) legitimate governmental action and decision. My purpose is to give some rea-
sons to accept not only that the British or Diceyan model makes sense from a
descriptive and from a normative point of view, but that it makes better sense than
the American or Marshallian model from both points of view. If the argument is
sound, it may contribute both to the rehabilitation of Dicey’s constitutionalism
and to a better understanding of contemporary practice of constitutional adjudi-
cation, especially in those countries that share a British constitutional heritage.4
* Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Montreal (luc.tremblay@umontreal.ca).
1 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (US Sup Ct). 
2 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th edn Macmillan, London 1959).
3 One might wish to describe differently the American and British models. Up to a certain extent, the
characterization depends on the particular features one wishes to emphasize for a given purpose.
Moreover, my description of the models do not claim to represent American or British constitution-
alism as they ‘really’ are or what would be considered as contemporary dominant views of the two
models. 
4 In my view, the Diceyan model of constitutionalism fits the contemporary practice of constitutional
adjudication in many Commonwealth countries, such as Canada, Australia, South Africa, New
Zealand and India. I also believe that it fits the practice of constitutional adjudication in many coun-
tries that are not members of the Commonwealth, such as Germany, Italy and, paradoxically, the
United States. This paper, however, is not an essay in comparative constitutional law. I concentrate
on Canadian practice, assuming it to be paradigmatic (but see n 17 and n 47, below). Moreover, this
paper is not an essay on the concept of legitimacy. For my purposes, it is sufficient to say that I use the
concept in its moral sense. Moral legitimacy is a matter of a person or a group of persons claiming to
have authority or exercising effective power over individuals such that they are morally justified to
command in general or to issue a particular command. Moral legitimacy is established by virtue of
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B TWO MODELS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
The American model of constitutionalism, as I shall call it, refers to the conception
of constitutionalism one may legitimately associate with Chief Justice Marshall’s
reasoning in Marbury.5 This model has probably become dominant within con-
temporary normative constitutional theory. It expresses two main ideas. First, it
expresses the idea that a written constitution is legally foundational. The constitu-
tion constitutes the ‘supreme law of the land’ and provides the criteria of legal
validity of all political action and decision. It follows that all governmental powers
in the State, be it the judiciary, the legislative or the executive, ultimately owe their
legal existence, scope and force to the terms of the written constitution.6 Second,
it expresses the idea that the supremacy of the written constitution has been made
morally legitimate by virtue of some original act of will or consent by a sovereign
people. In Marshall’s reasoning, for example, the people are conceived as having
an ‘original right’ to establish at will their own constitution and the expression of
their will is found in the written Constitution.7 It follows that everything that is
done in accordance with its terms is morally authorized and, consequently, should
be accepted as legitimate in principle. Correspondingly, everything that is incon-
sistent with its terms is not made under its authority and, consequently, should not
be accepted as legitimate in principle.8
It follows from the Marshallian model that the written constitution, being the
expression of the will of the sovereign people, should be conceived as the very source
of what should be accepted as legitimate governmental action and decision. By
providing the conditions governmental action and decision must satisfy in order 
to be accepted as constitutionally valid, the written constitution supplies the con-
ditions such action and decision must satisfy in order to be accepted as morally
legitimate. Thus if the constitution provided that ‘no legislation is valid law unless
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formal, procedural or substantive morally justified conditions that an authority or power must prac-
tically satisfy. For a remarkable recent discussion on three concepts of legitimacy, see R Fallon,
‘Legitimacy and the Constitution’ (2005) 118 Harvard L Rev 1787. 
5 See (n 1), above.
6 This assertion would also apply to legal powers that are not explicitly mentioned in the text, such as
‘residuary’ or ‘reserved’ powers, and to legal rights such as ‘pre-existing’ rights provided that they are
referred to through a general constitutional provision. See, for example, the Ninth and the Tenth
Amendments to the American Constitution; Constitution Act 1867 ss 91 and 92(16) (30 & 31 Vict c
3) (UK); Canada Act 1982 c 11 sch B paras 26 and 35 (UK).
7 Marbury (n 1) 176, 177: ‘That the people have an original right to establish for their future govern-
ment such principles, as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness is the basis on
which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great
exertion; nor can it, nor ought it, to be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established,
are deemed fundamental. And as the authority from which they proceed is supreme, and can seldom
act, they are designed to be permanent. . . . Certainly all those who have framed written constitu-
tions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, . . .’.
8 I described the American model in greater detail in LB Tremblay, ‘Marbury v Madison and Canadian
Constitutionalism: Rhetoric and Practice’ (2004) 36 George Washington Intl L Rev 515. 
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it possesses such and such democratic pedigree’, the legitimating force of legisla-
tion that would satisfy this condition would owe nothing to the fact that it would
be consistent with some independent moral principle of democracy. The 
legitimating force would merely derive from its conformity with the provisions of
the constitution. The same judgment would follow if the constitution allowed a
legislature to do horrible things; a valid statute prescribing doing such things
would be conceived as morally permissible in principle and entitled to judicial
enforcement, merely by virtue of its conformity with the constitution. 
This first model explains why the institution of judicial review of the constitu-
tionality of governmental action and decision can be accepted as morally legit-
imate. Governmental institutions are conceived as nothing more than ‘trustees’ or
‘agents’ of the sovereign people. The scope of their legitimate authority is accord-
ingly conditioned by the original will expressed in the written constitution.9
Consequently, when the judiciary reviews the constitutionality of legislative and
executive acts and declares invalid or inoperative such and such acts inconsistent
with the terms of the Constitution, it actually upholds the will of the people.10
The British model of constitutionalism, as I shall call it, refers to the conception
of constitutionalism one may legitimately associate with Albert V Dicey’s theory
of the British Constitution, although my description goes much further than what
Dicey would probably have conceded. In his Introduction, published by the end of
the 19th century, Dicey argued that the British Constitution had three main 
characteristics: the sovereignty of Parliament, the rule of law and constitutional
conventions. With respect to the rule of law, Dicey argued that this concept
included three distinct though kindred conceptions. The first two are well-known:
(1) absence of arbitrariness and exclusion of wide discretionary power through
legality and (2) equality before the law. The third meaning is much less known. It
expressed what I take to be Dicey’s model of constitutionalism. It expressed the
idea that the law of the constitution is the consequence of the rights of private 
persons, as determined by the courts in particular cases. Dicey wrote: 
We may say that the constitution is pervaded by the rule of law on the ground
that the general principles of the constitution (as for example the right to per-
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9 Marbury (n 1) 176, 177: ‘This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to
different departments, their respective powers. It may either stop here, or establish certain limits not
to be transcended by those departments. The government of the United States is of the latter
description. The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be
mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. . . . Certainly all those who have framed written
constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and,
consequently, the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repug-
nant to the constitution, is void’.
10 ibid 177, 178: ‘It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that
rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. . . . This
is of the very essence of judicial duty. If, then, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the con-
stitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such ordinary
act, must govern the case to which they both apply’.
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sonal liberty, or the right of public meeting) are with us the result of judicial deci-
sions determining the rights of private persons in particular cases brought before
the courts . . . [The constitution is] the fruit of contests carried on in the courts
on behalf of the rights of individuals. Our constitution, in short, is a judge-made
constitution, and it bears on its face all the features, good and bad, of judge-
made law. . . . [I]n England, the so-called principles of the constitution are
inductions or generalisations based upon particular decisions pronounced by
the courts as to the rights of given individuals. . . . [W]ith us the law of the con-
stitution, the rules which in foreign countries naturally form part of a constitu-
tional code, are not the source but the consequence of the rights of individuals,
as defined and enforced by the courts; . . . thus the constitution is the result of
the ordinary law of the land.11
These passages are open to interpretation. In Dicey’s mind, they certainly
meant that British judges had been committed to enforce certain basic individual
rights against governmental action and decision on the ground that these rights
were protected by the ‘ordinary law of the land’. But the ordinary law of the land
was for the most part the common law, that is, the laws and customs declared or
recognized to be law by judges. The ordinary law of the land, thus, partly consti-
tuted a set of ‘judge-made’ law. It follows that the basic rules and principles of 
constitutional law referred to by Dicey were the consequence of some judicial
commitment to uphold a set of rights, protected by a kind of law elaborated 
by judges themselves, against governmental action and decision. Accordingly, 
the constitution was a ‘judge-made constitution’; its formal source was judicial
decisions.
Dicey’s project was descriptive. He wished to state the positive laws of the con-
stitution as they were, to arrange them in their order, to explain their meaning, to
exhibit their logical connection and to discuss their formal sources.12 As a nine-
teenth century legal positivist, he was not concerned with the normative constitu-
tional theory that could have guided judicial practical reasoning in the process of
constitution-making.13 This is why he explained the judicial attitude in terms 
of commitment toward certain rights and freedoms protected by the ‘ordinary law
of the land’. But this explanation remains unsatisfactory. For one may legitimately
ask: How can we explain this judicial commitment toward the protection of 
individual rights against governmental action? How could we make practically
intelligible the fact that judges would have been committed to uphold certain
80 Two Models of Constitutionalism and the Legitimacy of Law ouclj vol 6 no 1
11 Dicey (n 2) 195, 196, 197–8, 203, 203.
12 Dicey (n 2) 32–4. Yet, Dicey believed that the British Constitution was a good constitution. For
example, he argued that basic political rights and freedoms were better protected in Great Britain
by the ordinary law of the land through common law remedies in the courts than by written con-
stitutions that declare rights but do not provide remedies or that could be suspended or taken away
by the constituent. 
13 Dicey (n 2) 1–35. On Dicey’s legal positivism, see LB Tremblay, ‘La théorie constitutionnelle et la
primauté du droit’ (1994) 39 McGill LJ 101. 
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rights and freedoms rather than upholding governmental power to override any
inconsistent individual interest? 
As I argued elsewhere, I submit that we can make it practically intelligible if we
postulate that the judiciary has been committed to maintain and uphold the ‘con-
ditions’ governmental action and decision must satisfy in order to be accepted by
the courts as politically legitimate and, consequently, as entitled to judicial
enforcement.14 Accordingly, Dicey’s assertion that the law of the constitution was
the consequence of the rights of private persons, as determined by the courts in
particular cases, should be understood as meaning that the law of the constitution
was the consequence of the ‘conditions’ governmental action and decision must sat-
isfy in order to be accepted as politically legitimate and entitled to judicial enforce-
ment, as determined by the courts in particular cases. In this sense, Dicey’s model
entails that the law of the constitution should be conceived as the consequence of
(what should be accepted as) legitimate governmental action and decision. The
reasoning is the following: by providing the conditions governmental action and
decision must satisfy in order to be accepted as politically legitimate and, conse-
quently, as entitled to judicial enforcement, the judiciary supplies the conditions
such action and decision must satisfy in order to be accepted as constitutionally
valid. 
Such model of constitutionalism must presuppose some judicial commitment
toward a certain normative conception of political legitimacy and, depending on
the nature of this normative conception, the nature of the law of the constitution
may vary. Thus if the normative conception of political legitimacy provided that
the government can do anything at will, including horrible things, a governmen-
tal decree prescribing doing such things would be accepted by judges as morally
permissible in principle and entitled to judicial enforcement. The courts would
accordingly recognize the normative force of the decree. Similarly, if the nor-
mative conception of political legitimacy provided that ‘no governmental action
limiting personal freedom is morally legitimate unless it can be justified by some
legal warrant or authority’, the legitimating force of the legal means for the
enforcement of this principle (the writ of habeas corpus, redress, for example)
would owe nothing to the fact that they would derive from an existing written con-
stitution. Their legitimating force would derive from their conformity with the
independent principle postulated by the normative conception. 
The basic law of the constitution is therefore derivative and its content is a func-
tion of the substance of the normative conception of political morality.
Correspondingly, this conception of political legitimacy is logically antecedent to
and independent of the resulting constitutional norms, for it is by virtue of this 
conception that judges can construct or determine the nature and content of con-
stitutional norms. Of course, this does not tell us what this conception has been or
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14 LB Tremblay, ‘General Legitimacy of Judicial Review and the Fundamental Basis of Constitutional
Law’ (2003) 23 OJLS 525, 547–8. 
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what it should be, and moreover, this does not tell us how judges have proceeded
or should proceed in order to construct it. However, if Dicey’s description were
true, the normative conception of political legitimacy that might have guided the
judiciary should be associated with what has become known as the doctrine of con-
stitutionalism. It has supplied certain conditions of reasonable governance and
decent society, such as respect for certain individual rights and freedoms.15
C THE DESCRIPTIVE FORCE OF THE MARSHALLIAN
MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
From a descriptive point of view, the American or Marshallian model of constitu-
tionalism does not adequately fit the contemporary practice of enforcing a written
constitution through the institution of judicial review. There is a gap between the
constitutional system the American model purports to support and explain and the
operative principles, values and norms by which the process of judicial review
actually operates. The American model postulates that judicial review of the con-
stitutionality of governmental action and decision can be accepted as legitimate
provided that judicial decision to invalidate such action or decision is justified by
the will of the original people, as expressed in the written constitution. For this rea-
son, the model necessarily entails some version of what American scholars have
called ‘originalism’.16 It postulates that the reasons on the basis of which the courts
may legitimately determine the legal validity of governmental action and decision
must have been somewhat ‘intended’ by the original people. Accordingly, it pre-
supposes a set of ‘original’ constitutional norms fixing the objective constitutional
meaning and a kind of rational methodology that makes it possible for the courts
to ascertain them.17 Yet, contemporary practice of judicial review is generally
inconsistent with originalism. 
In what follows, I substantiate this claim through a few examples drawn from
Canadian constitutional law. I could have taken them from many other
Commonwealth jurisdictions, such as Australia, India and South Africa, as well as
from many non Commonwealth jurisdictions including the United States. But I
shall not describe in any detail the actual form of constitutional adjudication in
82 Two Models of Constitutionalism and the Legitimacy of Law ouclj vol 6 no 1
15 In the 18th century, H St John Bolingbroke wrote: ‘By constitution we mean . . . that assemblage of
laws, institutions and customs, derived from certain fixed principles of reason, directed to certain
fixed objects of public good, that compose the general system, according to which the community
hath agreed to be governed’. Quoted in SM Griffin, American Constitutionalism From Theory to Politics
(Princeton University Press, Princeton 1996) 11. See generally Tremblay (n 14).
16 Of course, the true nature of the original constitutional norms and the nature of true originalist
methodology is a matter of debate among specialists. But the significant point is the formalist claim
that no judicial interpretation and application of the written constitution is legitimate unless it is
made in accordance with the principles (rules, purposes, values, standards) intended or understood
by the original people. See Tremblay (n 8) 520–1. 
17 ibid 520. 
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Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth jurisdictions; this would constitute 
variations on a comparative law theme. My immediate purpose is to argue that 
the American or Marshallian model of constitutionalism does not fit the actual
practice of constitutional adjudication, assuming that this practice is generally
known by the readers and that Canadian constitutional jurisprudence is somewhat
paradigmatic.18
After 1982, Canadian constitutionalism has come to be generally conceived as
a version of the American model of constitutionalism. In 1982, the United
Kingdom Parliament enacted the Canada Act which included, among other
things, a new ‘local’ procedure for the amendment of the Canadian Constitution
and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.19 The main purpose of the
new procedure of constitutional amendment was to terminate the legal authority
of the Imperial Parliament over Canada. Since Canada would now have the entire
legal control over the content of its Constitution, this Constitution would now be
the Constitution of the ‘people’ of Canada. It would become ‘their’ Constitution.
The original name of the Constitution, the British North America Act, was
changed to Constitution Act, 1867,20 suggesting that the text should not be
referred to as an old Imperial Act, but as the constitution of an independent and
sovereign country. One of the main purposes of the Charter was to unite the
Canadian people around a set of fundamental substantive values.21
Formally, Canadian constitutionalism came to be conceived by judges in terms
similar to those of the American model of constitutionalism.22 In the very first case
dealing with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Law Society of Upper Canada v
Skapinker,23 the Supreme Court denied any special legitimating force to the fact
that the written Constitution had been enacted by the United Kingdom
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18 For a general introduction to contemporary practice of constitutional adjudication see, for exam-
ple, N Jayawickrama, The Judicial Application of Human Rights Law: National, Regional, and International
Jurisprudence (CUP, Cambridge 2002). See, more specifically, T Blackshield, G Williams and 
BF Fitzgerald, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary and Materials (Federation Press,
Annandale, New South Wales 1996) and P Hanks, P Keyzer and J Clarke, Australian Constitutional
Law: Materials and Commentary (7th edn Butterworths, Sydney 2004) (for Australia); HM Seervai,
Constitutional Law of India: A Critical Commentary (3rd edn Tripathi, Bombay 1983); SP Sathe, ‘Judicial
Activism: The Indian Experience’ (2001) 6 Washington U J of L & Policy 29 (for India); 
P de Vos, ‘South Africa’s Constitutional Court: Starry-Eyed in the Face of History’ (2001–2002) 26
Vt L Rev 837 (for South Africa). For an introduction to judicial adjudication in the area of funda-
mental values in New Zealand, see PA Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2nd
edn Brookers, Wellington 2001); P Rishworth, G Huscroft, S Optican and R Mahoney, The New
Zealand Bill of Rights (OUP, Oxford 2003). For an introduction to the practice of constitutional adju-
dication in the US, see LH Tribe, American Constitutional Law (3rd edn Foundation Press, New York
2000). 
19 Constitution Act 1982 pt 1 (being Canada Act 1982 sch B) c 11 (UK) [hereinafter ‘the Charter’]. 
20 30 & 31 Vict c3 (UK) reprinted in RSC 1985 app II no 5 [hereinafter ‘Constitution Act 1867’].
21 See PH Russell, ‘The Political Purposes of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ (1983)
61 Canadian Bar Rev 30.
22 See Tremblay (n 8) 526–9: ‘Indeed, it has become a daily experience to hear lawyers, politicians,
public figures, or journalists speaking about the “Americanization” of the Canadian Constitution’.
23 [1984] 1 SCR 357.
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Parliament. This fact, the Court held, had a ‘mere historical curiosity value’.24 It
was a formal process of constitutional amendment that had lost relevancy ‘on the
ultimate adoption of the instrument as the Constitution’.25 The written
Constitution should be seen as ‘a part of the constitution of a nation’.26 One year
later, in a case dealing with the supremacy of the Constitution and the legitimacy
of judicial review, the Motor Vehicle Act (BC) Reference,27 the Supreme Court clearly
said that: 
It ought not to be forgotten that the historic decision to entrench the Charter in our
Constitution was taken not by the courts but by the elected representatives of the people
of Canada. It was those representatives who extended the scope of constitutional adjudi-
cation and entrusted the courts with this new and onerous responsibility. Adjudication
under the Charter must be approached free of any lingering doubts as to its legitimacy.28
Indeed, the expression ‘elected representatives of the people of Canada.’ as
opposed to the Imperial Parliament’ emphasized the legitimating source of the
Charter, as opposed to its legal source. More recently, in a case calling into ques-
tion the legitimacy of the Canadian Constitution, the Quebec Secession Reference,29 the
Supreme Court stated that the proclamation of the Constitution Act, 1982 was legit-
imate, although formally enacted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom: ‘the
legitimacy as distinguished from the formal legality of the amendments derived
from political decisions taken in Canada within a legal framework which this
Court, in the Patriation Reference, had ruled was in accordance with our
Constitution’.30 As for the legitimacy of the Constitution Act 1867, the Court
asserted that this Act, although legally instituted by the Imperial Parliament,
resulted from ‘an initiative of elected representatives of the people then living in the
colonies scattered across part of what is now Canada. It was not initiated by
Imperial fiat’.31
This was significant. The ‘original’ will, consent or decision of the elected rep-
resentatives of the people would have conferred the Constitution its legitimating
force. Naturally, thus, the basic rules and principles of the written Constitution
came to be seen as the source of legitimate governmental action and decision.32 It
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24 [1984] 1 SCR 365. 
25 ibid. 
26 ibid.
27 Motor Vehicle Act (BC) Reference [1985] 2 SCR 486. 
28 ibid 497. 
29 Reference Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217.
30 ibid [47].
31 ibid [35] (emphasis added). Not only were the resolutions that subsequently became the British
North America Act approved by local delegates, but they were confirmed by Local Parliaments
before being translated into law by the Imperial Parliament. 
32 In the Quebec Secession Reference (n 29) [72], for example, the Supreme Court asserted that Canadian
laws and political institutions have no other source, authority and legitimacy than what is provided
for in the Constitution and that the legitimacy of the Constitution derived from the people: ‘Simply
put, the constitutionalism principle requires that all government action comply with the
Constitution. . . . This Court has noted on several occasions that with the adoption of the Charter,
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should have followed, then, that the process of constitutional interpretation should
have come within originalism: the constitutional norms which establish the legit-
imate sphere of governmental actions and decisions and on the basis of which the
court could legitimately determine their validity should have been intended by the
original will, consent or decision of the elected representatives of the people. But
this has not been the case. The practice of constitutional adjudication in Canada
has been radically inconsistent with originalism. 
In its very first decisions applying the Charter, the Supreme Court explicitly
rejected originalism.33 In 1985, for example, the Court explicitly stated that the
meaning of the Constitution, that is, its substance or its norms, should not derive
from the original intention of the bodies which adopted the Charter or from the
original meaning as understood at the moment of adoption.34 The Court con-
sidered various epistemological reasons, such as the ambiguity of the ‘historical
usage of the terms used’,35 the ‘inherently unreliable’ character of the relevant
statements and speeches by prominent figures36 and the fact that the ‘intent’ of the
legislative bodies that adopted the Constitution was ‘nearly impossible of proof ’.37
However correct such arguments could be, they made the Court’s position quite
paradoxical. If judicial review based upon the written Constitution is conceived as
legitimate for the specific reason that the Constitution has been willed, consented
to or decided by the elected representatives, then the norms that may legitimately
be used as judicial reason to invalidate governmental action and decision must be
inferred from what has been willed, consented to or decided, that is, the original
norms of the Constitution. But if the epistemological reasons are correct and,
accordingly, the ‘discovery’ or ‘reconstruction’ of such norms is impossible, one
may wonder what legitimating force original consent really has? 
Secondly, the Court decided that constitutional interpretation must be progres-
sive. This approach even constituted an independent reason, perhaps the most
important, to reject originalism: constitutional meaning should not be ‘frozen in
time to the moment of adoption with little or no possibility of growth, development
and adjustment to changing societal needs’.38 In the Court’s opinion, constitu-
tional values must grow and develop ‘over time to meet new social, political and
historical realities often unimagined by its framers’.39 The Constitution, in short,
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the Canadian system of government was transformed to a significant extent from a system of
Parliamentary supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy. The Constitution binds all govern-
ments, both federal and provincial, including the executive branch . . . They may not transgress its
provisions: indeed, their sole claim to exercise lawful authority rests in the powers allocated to them
under the Constitution, and can come from no other source. . .’. 
33 See Tremblay (n 8) 531–8. 
34 Motor Vehicle Act (BC) Reference (n 27). 
35 ibid 512. 
36 ibid 508. 
37 ibid.
38 ibid 509. 
39 Hunter v Southam Inc [1984] 2 SCR 145, 155. 
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should be understood as a ‘living tree’.40 Indeed, this approach might be right. But
it also contributes to make the Court’s position paradoxical. According to the
American model, the legitimating force of constitutional norms and values derives
from the fact that they have been willed, consented to or decided by the original
people or by their elected representatives. However, progressive interpretation
allows the courts not only to use a set of norms or values that have not been willed,
consented to or decided by the original people or by their elected representatives
as reason not to enforce certain governmental action or decision but to determine
themselves the conditions under which legitimate constitutional norms must be
adjusted to societal needs, abandoned and replaced by new norms. 
Thirdly, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the interpretation of constitu-
tional provisions must be ascertained by an analysis of their purposes.41 But such
purposes are not ‘original’ purposes, that is, purposes the drafters of the constitu-
tion had in mind when the text was written down. The purposes are constructed
in accordance with the Constitution’s larger objects and the Constitution’s ‘proper
linguistic, philosophic and historical contexts’, as understood by judges.42 They
result from a version of what philosophers call a ‘wide reflective equilibrium’
between all considerations that have something relevant to say about the meaning
of the provisions.43 Accordingly, the purposes of constitutional provisions may
have nothing, or very little, to do with what the elected representatives of the
Canadian people consented to as a matter of psychological and historical fact.44
The purposes of constitutional provisions, therefore, constitute various judicial
constructions that can be conceptually detached from what is supposed to give the
Constitution its normative force. 
Fourthly, the Canadian Supreme Court has also recognized that judicial review
could be based upon what it describes as ‘unwritten constitutional principles’. But
such principles, being ‘unwritten’, do not necessarily express some original will,
decision or intent. They are rather constructed by the judiciary so as to make sense
of the body of express constitutional provisions read in accordance with history
and precedent.45 Now, judicial appeal to unwritten constitutional principles may
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40 See Motor Vehicle Act (BC) Reference (n 27).
41 See Hunter (n 39). 
42 R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd [1985] 1 SCR 295, 344.
43 On an analysis of the process of purposive interpretation, see LB Tremblay, ‘L¢ interprétation
téléologique des droits constitutionnels’ (1995) 29 RJT 459. On the concept of ‘wide reflective equi-
librium’. In this context, see 489–91. 
44 See the criticisms of P Monahan, Politics and the Constitution (Carswell, Toronto 1987) ch 5. 
45 In the Quebec Secession Reference (n 29) [49]-[51] it was said that: ‘Behind the written word is an histor-
ical lineage stretching back through the ages, which aids in the consideration of the underlying con-
stitutional principles. These principles inform and sustain the constitutional text: they are the vital
unstated assumptions upon which the text is based . . . Our Constitution has an internal architecture,
or . . . a “basic constitutional structure”. The individual elements of the Constitution are linked to the
others, and must be interpreted by reference to the structure of the Constitution as a whole . . .
Although these underlying principles are not explicitly made part of the Constitution by any written
provision, other than in some respects by the oblique reference in the preamble to the Constitution Act,
1867, it would be impossible to conceive of our constitutional structure without them’.
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serve different purposes. For example, the courts may refer to them as aids in the
process of interpreting the specific text of constitutional provisions46 or they may
refer to them to ‘fill out the gaps in the express terms of the constitutional
scheme’.47 In all cases, they state a reason to create new abstract and concrete con-
stitutional norms and obligations or new exceptions to existing constitutional
norms and obligations. Since the resulting constitutional norms and obligations
based upon such unwritten principles cannot be justified in terms of original will,
consent or decision, as expressed in the written text, their legitimating force
remains problematical. 
These examples drawn from the Canadian practice of constitutional adjudica-
tion are not peculiar to Canada; as I said, they can be found in many
Commonwealth jurisdictions, such as Australia, India and South Africa, and non
Commonwealth jurisdictions as well, including the United States.48 They, 
however, show that it has become very difficult, even for a judiciary committed to
the American or Marshallian model of constitutionalism as a basic normative
theoretical position, to act in accordance with its basic postulates. Indeed, episte-
mological and normative reasons in a ‘post-formalist’ legal culture might explain
this attitude and might be sufficient to justify it. However, in all cases, it should be
admitted that the American or Marshallian model of constitutionalism is not con-
sistent with the actual judicial practice of enforcing a written constitution against
governmental action and decision. 
D THE DESCRIPTIVE FORCE OF THE DICEYAN MODEL OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM
In this section, I argue that contemporary practice of constitutional adjudication
is consistent with Dicey’s model of constitutionalism and, accordingly, that Dicey’s
model makes better sense of contemporary practice of constitutional adjudication
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than the American model. My purpose, however, is not to prove that such practice
is actually based upon Dicey’s model, especially if one understands by ‘proof’ a
kind of demonstration that meets empiricist or positivist standards of verification. 
According to the Diceyan model, I recall, the rules and principles of the
Constitution can be conceived as the consequence of certain criteria of political
legitimacy accepted and enforced by the courts. This entails two basic proposi-
tions. First, the courts must be in a position to ascertain and recognize as norma-
tive a set of criteria of legitimate governmental action and decision. Secondly, the
criteria of political legitimacy must be conceived as logically antecedent to and
independent of the resulting constitutional norms, for it is by virtue of them that
judges can construct or determine the nature and content of constitutional norms.
Indeed, they constitute (or derive from) a certain normative theory of political
legitimacy. According to Dicey’s theory, such criteria included governmental
respect for certain individual rights. 
However, Dicey’s theory purported to describe the laws of an unwritten consti-
tution. How would such a theory be acceptable in a context where constitutions
are written? Does a written constitution commit us to a Marshallian model of con-
stitutionalism? The answer is no and the reason is found within Dicey’s model. 
Dicey propounded a view on judicial interpretation of legal texts. I shall call this
view ‘Dicey’s textualism’ to distinguish it from other versions of textualism.
According to Dicey’s textualism, there is only one formal interpretive constraint
within the process of judicial interpretation: judges must understand textual 
provisions in terms of meaning or norms that can plausibly (that is, reasonably) be
supported by the ‘words’ used in the text.49 Insofar as the concept of original or
legislative ‘intention’ plays a normative role in that process, the alleged intention
must also be inferred from the ‘words’ of the legal text taken as a whole, as opposed
to any psychological or socio-historical fact. In the context of an Act of Parliament,
Dicey said: ‘The courts will take no notice of the will of the electors. The judges
know nothing about any will of the people except in so far as that will is expressed
by an Act of Parliament’.50
[T]he English Bench have always refused, in principle at least, to interpret an Act of Parliament other-
wise than by reference to the words of the enactment. An English judge will take no notice of the
resolutions of either House, of anything which may have passed in debate (a matter of
which officially he has no cognisance), or even of the changes which a Bill may have
undergone between the moment of its first introduction to Parliament and of its receiv-
ing the Royal assent.51
Yet, Dicey’s textualism is not very constraining. Judges may determine the
meaning of constitutional provisions in accordance with a whole range of 
competing interpretive approaches and methodologies. They may proceed within
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formalism and abstract conceptualism or within pragmatism, they may favour
strict constructionism or liberal constructionism, they may apply formal deductive
reasoning or purposive reasoning, they may be originalist or favour a progressive
interpretation, and so on. Indeed, the words of legal texts often support compet-
ing meanings. Yet, so long as judges interpret the words of the text by reading in
values that plausibly fit them, the resulting norms should be recognized as legit-
imate. 
For this reason, Dicey’s textualism might sound a very poor constitutional
theory, if at all. It seems to free judges from any guidance, whereas the main point
of constitutional theory, at least as understood within contemporary constitutional
scholarship, seems to be to supply a set of normative interpretive constraints that
should guide judges in the process of determining which plausible meaning is the
right one. Yet, Dicey’s textualism is specifically designed for the purposes of
Diceyan constitutionalism. It allows the courts to use their authority to resist what
they regard as unreasonable, indecent or illegitimate governmental action or 
decision. Dicey’s textualism allows judges to give legal texts meanings that are, in
their views, morally entitled to judicial enforcement. In the context of Dicey’s 19th
century British unwritten Constitution, that meant that the courts could interpret
an Act of Parliament so as to avoid enforcing legislative norms authorizing the
exercise of governmental power that would be understood by judges as arbitrary
or inconsistent with certain basic rights and freedoms.52 Indeed, Dicey’s textual-
ism is the key to understand Dicey’s reconciliation of the sovereignty of Parliament
with the rule of law. As Dicey wrote: 
The fact that the most arbitrary powers of the English executive must always be exercised
under Act of Parliament places the government, even when armed with the widest
authority, under the supervision, so to speak, of the courts. Powers, however extra-
ordinary, which are conferred or sanctioned by statute, are never really unlimited, for
they are confined by the words of the Act itself, and, what is more, by the interpretation
put upon the statute by the judges. Parliament is supreme legislator, but from the
moment Parliament has uttered its will as lawgiver, that will becomes subject to the interpreta-
tion put upon it by the judges of the land, and the judges, who are influenced by the feelings of magistrates
no less than the general spirit of the common law, are disposed to construe statutory exceptions to common
law principles in a mode which would not commend itself either to a body of officials, or to the Houses of
Parliament, if the Houses were called upon to interpret their own enactments.53
Now, Dicey’s textualism could be as significant in contemporary contexts where
constitutions are written. Then it would mean that the courts could interpret 
constitutional documents so as to avoid enforcing legislative and executive acts
understood by judges as arbitrary, unreasonable, indecent or illegitimate for some
reason (say because they would violate certain basic moral rights and freedoms).
The case being, one would be entitled to claim that the people or their elected 
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representatives are sovereign, but from the moment they have uttered their will
through the constitution, that will becomes subject to the interpretation put upon
it by the judges of the land who are influenced by their commitment to enforce
reasonable, decent and legitimate governmental action and decision. In my view,
this proposition would correspond to Dicey’s assertion that judges are influenced
by the ‘feelings of magistrates’ no less than by the ‘general spirit of the common
law’ disposing them to construe a legal text in a mode which would not necessar-
ily commend itself to its authors if they had been called upon to interpret their own
constitutional document. 
My thesis is that contemporary practice of constitutional adjudication would 
be best conceived as being generally regulated by some version of textualism, as
understood within Dicey’s model of constitutionalism. Once more, Canadian con-
stitutional jurisprudence may exemplify this thesis, although many other
Commonwealth and non Commonwealth jurisdictions could be used as well. In
Canada, judges have not postulated that the provisions of the written Constitution
are ascertainable in accordance with one single normative interpretive methodol-
ogy or one single kind of legitimate arguments. Canadian judges have determined
the meaning of constitutional provisions in accordance with a whole range of 
competing interpretive approaches and methodologies. They have proceeded
from time to time in accordance with some version of legal formalism, abstract
conceptualism, pragmatism, strict constructionism, liberal constructionism, for-
mal deductive reasoning, purposive reasoning, originalism, progressivism, and so
on. The only formal constraint seems to have been the ‘words’ used in the con-
stitutional text: meanings should plausibly be supported by the interpreted pro-
visions.54
In the context of the Charter, for example, the Supreme Court has established
that the process of interpretation must be ‘purposive’, ‘progressive’ and ‘generous’.
The purposive approach claims that the Constitution must be understood in the
light of the interests its provisions ‘are meant to protect’.55 However, such inter-
ests are by no means regarded as formally established in advance, either by some
original intent or otherwise by the objective meaning of the words. Judges deter-
mine the interests by using almost any relevant argument and consideration, such
as the words used in the text, headings, English and French versions, precedents,
concepts, history, philosophical and political tradition, international documents,
foreign constitutions and foreign constitutional interpretations. Moreover, since
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the process of interpretation must also be generous and progressive, the
Constitution being a ‘living tree’, the courts may easily depart from the interests
constitutional provisions were ‘meant to protect’, if they ever meant to protect
something determined, or understood in prior cases as ‘meant to protect’. This is
why the Canadian constitutional expert Peter Hogg could describe as ‘orthodox
constitutional law’ the propositions that ‘judicial review of legislation must be
based exclusively on the words of the constitution, and that the words of the 
constitution should receive a progressive interpretation [and] a “purposive” inter-
pretation’.56 With respect to progressive interpretation, he argued that: 
. . . judicial review can be derived from the constitution while departing from or ignor-
ing the original understanding. The doctrine of progressive interpretation is no less faith-
ful to the constitutional text than interpretivism. Like interpretivism, it is based on the
words of the constitution, read in the context of the document as a whole. It differs from
interpretivism only in that the doctrine of progressive interpretation assumes that the
words of the constitution need not be frozen in the sense in which they were understood
by the framers, but are to be read in a sense that is appropriate to current conditions.57
Similarly, Hogg maintained that a purposive approach to constitutional inter-
pretation is ‘useful in elaborating those words . . . that are especially vague or
ambiguous’,58 even if the actual purpose is usually unknown and if the
Constitution pursues ‘a range of purposes’.59 As long as the interpretation is con-
sistent with the terms used in the constitutional provisions, judicial review is
acceptable. Indeed, Hogg argued that ‘judicial review is only legitimate if it is
based on the text of the constitution’.60
Consequently, contemporary practice of constitutional adjudication, as exem-
plified by Canadian experience, should be best conceived as coming within
Dicey’s textualism, as opposed to originalism for example. This fact constitutes a
reason, although not sufficient, to believe that Dicey’s model of constitutionalism
makes better sense of contemporary practice of constitutional adjudication than
the American model. Moreover, insofar as the actual practice of textualism did
operate within a set of normative constraints similar in principle to that postulated
within Dicey’s model, then one would have good reason to conceive contempor-
ary practice of constitutional adjudication as coming within Dicey’s model, as
opposed to Marshallian model. 
However, the demonstration that this is actually the case is almost impossible to
do, especially if one is expecting a kind of ‘proof’ consistent with empiricist or 
positivist standards. Judges do not, or very rarely, state that their textualism is 
ultimately constrained by a set of normative criteria of political legitimacy that
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determines the kind of governmental action and decision that are morally entitled
to judicial enforcement. In other words, judges do not, or very rarely, explicitly
recognize in cases that constitutional norms are the consequence of what should
be accepted as legitimate governmental action and decision. Yet, one may legit-
imately ask: How can we explain this judicial commitment to what I call textual-
ism in constitutional context, indeed in free and democratic society? How could
we make practically intelligible the fact that judges formally free themselves from
originalism, literalism or other kinds of formalism in context where written consti-
tutions are regarded as the basis of legitimate governmental action and decision?
How can we rationally accept Dicey’s textualism without endorsing arbitrariness
and judicial tyranny? I suggest that one answer can be found in Dicey’s model of
constitutionalism. Dicey’s textualism can be made practically intelligible if we pos-
tulate that the judiciary is committed to maintain and uphold the conditions gov-
ernmental action and decision must satisfy in order to be accepted by the courts as
politically legitimate and, consequently, as entitled to judicial enforcement. 
Conceiving the practice of constitutional adjudication in accordance with
Dicey’s model would indeed entail a certain number of assertions. Judges who
must decide what the written Constitution means should be seen as being ulti-
mately guided by a set of normative criteria of legitimate governmental action and
decision. This set would be conceived as logically antecedent to and independent
of the constitutional norms judges would recognize as valid and operative, for it
would be by virtue of this set of normative criteria that constitutional norms would
be determined and constructed. It would be by virtue of these criteria that the
interpretive approaches (purposive, generous and progressive, for example) and
relevant factors (terms used in provisions, concepts, historical, political and philo-
sophical contexts, for example) guiding the courts in the process of constitutional
interpretation (determining the ‘interests constitutional provisions are meant to
protect’, for example) would be adjudicated. These criteria would form the nor-
mative theory of political legitimacy accepted by the courts as sufficiently justified
for the purposes of contemporary constitutionalism. 
However, we have reason to believe that this makes sense of contemporary
process of constitutional adjudication, at least as exemplified by Canadian consti-
tutional law. The rules of interpretation, as well as the set of unwritten constitu-
tional principles, appear as flexible rhetorical means enabling judges to read the
meaning of constitutional provisions in terms of norms that, when they are
applied, contribute to maintain the legitimacy, decency and reasonableness of
governmental action and decision. For example, in R v Holmes,61 Chief Justice
Dickson of the Canadian Supreme Court wrote: 
The overarching principle of judicial review under the Charter is that the judiciary is
entrusted with the duty of ensuring that legislatures do not infringe unjustifiably upon
certain fundamental individual and collective interests in the name of the broader 
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common good. Viewed from one perspective, this profound responsibility potentially can
be seen as challenging the nature of democratic institutions in Canada, to the extent that
those institutions represent the collective voice of the communities and individuals which
comprise Canadian society. Viewed from another perspective, however, in interpreting
and giving meaning to constitutional guarantees and determining what constitutes rea-
sonable limits under s. 1 of the Charter, the courts are guided by the same principle
under both lines of inquiry: namely, that Canadian society is to be free and democratic.
The infusion of the spirit of individual and collective democratic aspirations into the
process of defining the contours of constitutional guarantees and determining the rea-
sonableness of state-imposed limitations on those guarantees thus ensures that the courts
are and will remain allies of Canadian democracy, strengthening any weaknesses of
democracy by providing a voice and a remedy for those excluded from equal and effec-
tive democratic participation in our society.62
This does not mean that the actual judicial conception of political legitimacy is
right, justified or otherwise acceptable. But it is entirely consistent with the propo-
sition that the Canadian Supreme Court is basically concerned with promoting
and maintaining the legitimacy of governmental action and decision they are
asked to enforce in any given case. The proposition that the courts are guided by
the principle that Canadian society is to be free and democratic in the process of
‘interpreting and giving meaning to constitutional guarantees and determining
what constitutes reasonable limits under s 1 of the Charter’ suggests that the norms
of constitutional law are the consequence of a set of criteria determining the legit-
imacy of governmental action and decision judges are asked to enforce in any
given case. This is entirely consistent with Diceyan model of constitutionalism.
Accordingly, there are reasons to argue that a Diceyan model of constitutional-
ism is superior to the American model from a descriptive point of view. On the one
hand, Dicey’s model seems to be corroborated by the kind of textualism manifested
in the practice of constitutional interpretation. On the other hand, the model
makes sense of Dicey’s textualism: it makes it practically intelligible by supplying its
point and its justification. Yet, the mere fact that a Diceyan model of constitution-
alism is consistent with contemporary practice of constitutional adjudication does
not prove that this practice is actually grounded upon Diceyan constitutionalism.
In particular, it does not prove that judges committed to textualism are actually
committed to maintain and uphold the conditions governmental action and deci-
sion must satisfy in order to be accepted by the courts as politically legitimate and,
consequently, as entitled to judicial enforcement. However, it certainly constitutes
a reason to argue that a Diceyan model makes better sense of contemporary 
practice of constitutional adjudication than the American or Marshallian model. If
it is the case, it constitutes a good reason to test the hypothesis that contemporary
practice of constitutional adjudication might actually be, after all, grounded upon
Diceyan constitutionalism. 
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E THE NORMATIVE FORCE OF THE DICEYAN
MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
In this section, I put forward one general argument showing that the Diceyan
model of constitutionalism makes sense from a normative point of view and that
we have reason to believe that it is sounder than the American model. However,
the Diceyan model is immediately problematical: it supports a kind of judicial
activism radically inconsistent with the sovereignty of the people and with the
principle of democratic legitimacy. How can we make it acceptable from a 
normative point of view? How can we accept as morally and politically legitimate
a judicial process coming within a Diceyan model of constitutionalism? 
In our democratic tradition, the judiciary is generally conceived as having no
inherent political legitimacy. Its moral and political legitimacy is conceived as
deriving from a moral principle indicating a set of positive facts by virtue of which
judicial power is specifically authorized. I call this thesis the Specific Legitimacy
Thesis.63 It claims, among other things, that judicial legitimacy is conditioned by
the ‘rule of law’. Although contested, this concept minimally means that the con-
tent and substance of judicial decisions must be in ‘accordance with the law’ or, to
put it differently, they must be ‘justified by law’.64 On the other hand, the law that
justifies judicial decision must itself be politically legitimate. If judicial legitimacy is
conditioned by the law that supports judicial decisions, then the judiciary has no
more legitimacy than the law that supports its decisions. Accordingly, no judicial
decision is acceptable as morally permissible, unless the law used by judges as rea-
son for decision is itself morally legitimate. If judicial decisions are to be accepted
as politically legitimate, thus, it must be in accordance with a law that is acceptable
as legitimate in accordance with some normative standard of political morality. 
It follows from this reasoning that if judges wished to act in a legitimate way, or
if we want them to act in a legitimate way, they should base their decisions upon
reasons that are both legal and acceptable as morally legitimate. For this purpose,
they should be allowed, authorized or entitled in some way to verify whether the
norms they are asked to enforce in a given case are both valid laws and legitimate
norms according to some independent normative standard of political morality.
Moreover, if such norms appear not to be legally valid or legally valid but not legit-
imate, they should be allowed, authorized or entitled in some way to set them aside.
But what could be the source of such authorization or entitlement? According to
the Specific Legitimacy Thesis, judicial legitimacy is conditioned by the rule of law
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provided that the law that is used as reason for judicial decision is morally per-
missible. It should follow, then, that any such authorization or entitlement should
be grounded upon or derived from another law (say a constitutional law). But this
other law cannot legitimize a judicial decision based upon it (for the purposes of
verifying the legality and the legitimacy of a norm alleged to be law and setting
aside) unless it is itself acceptable as morally legitimate. It should follow, then, that
the court should be allowed, authorized or entitled to verify the legitimacy of this
other law and, if it appears not to be legitimate, to set it aside. But what could be
the source of such further authorization or entitlement? According to the Specific
Legitimacy Thesis, it should be a further law the legitimacy of which being accept-
able as morally legitimate, and so on, at an infinite regress. So the Specific
Legitimacy Thesis creates a dilemma: either judges try to maintain their own 
political legitimacy at the cost of infinite regress or they enforce any norm alleged
to be law, even those that have no legitimacy at all, at the cost of loosing their own
specific legitimacy. 
If one wants to argue for the legitimacy of a Diceyan model of constitutional-
ism, one must find another ground. My suggestion is this: the political legitimacy
of judicial power can be grounded upon a very general principle of political moral-
ity. This general principle provides that ‘all political authorities in a state ought to
act, as far as possible, in a legitimate way’. This general principle is rarely acknow-
ledged within contemporary constitutional theory. Yet it has been presupposed by
most systematic thinking within normative political philosophy, at least since the
works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant.65 It is both constitutive and
regulative of the discourse on legitimacy within legal and political theory, for such
discourse would not be intelligible without it. I maintain that this general principle
of political morality actually underlies the recurrent debate on the legitimacy of
judicial review. 
Now, this general principle entails that all political authorities in a state ought
to do what is factually and morally necessary in order to act, as far as possible, in
a legitimate way. For example, it entails that political authorities in a state ought
not to act in ways that would not be legitimate. This, I submit, entails the existence
of a general entitlement or authorization to act, as far as factually and morally pos-
sible, in a legitimate way. This assertion might be conceived as a version of the
widely held ethical principle, the ‘ought-implies-can’ principle. Since the general
principle prescribes that political authorities ought to act as far as possible in legit-
imate way, it must entail that such authorities are morally permitted, authorized
or entitled to do what is necessary in order to act, as far as it is factually and
morally possible, in a legitimate way and to avoid to act, as far as it is factually and
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morally possible, in ways that would not be legitimate. In other words, the general
principle of political morality necessarily confers a kind of general legitimacy to
political authorities to do what is necessary to maintain their own legitimacy, as far
as it can be morally and factually possible. Otherwise, the general principle of
political morality would be pointless from a practical point of view.
The judiciary exercises, as a matter of fact, political authority in the state.
Accordingly, the general principle of political morality entails, on the one hand,
that the judiciary ought to act, as far as possible, in a legitimate way. On the other
hand, it entails that the judiciary is morally entitled to do what is necessary in order
to act, as far as it is factually and morally possible, in a legitimate way. This gen-
eral legitimacy to do what is necessary to maintain their political legitimacy con-
stitutes the ground for the legitimacy of judicial review. I call this thesis the
‘General Legitimacy Thesis’.66 However, what can the judiciary do in order to act,
as far as possible, in a legitimate way and, accordingly, to maintain their political
legitimacy? The answer derives from the Specific Legitimacy Thesis. It follows two
consequences: (1) judges are morally entitled to verify whether the alleged law they
are asked to enforce in any given case is legally valid and, if so, if it is morally legit-
imate in accordance with the relevant normative standards and (2) judges are
morally entitled not to enforce (or to set aside or ignore) any alleged law that is not
legally valid or, if legally valid, not morally legitimate. Otherwise, the judiciary
could violate the general principle of political morality by acting in ways that may
not be legitimate.
The General Legitimacy Thesis supplies the ground or source of the moral
authorization or entitlement conferred to the judiciary to verify whether the norms
they are asked to enforce in a given case are valid legitimate laws according to
some independent normative standard of political morality and to set them aside,
if such norms appear not to be valid or not to be legitimate laws. It supplies the
ground or source of the legitimacy of judicial review. I suggest that the normative
force of the Diceyan model of constitutionalism proceeds from a thesis of this kind.
It can be explained by the fact that there is a general principle of political moral-
ity providing that ‘all political authorities in a state ought to act, as far as possible,
in a legitimate way’ and that judges, as political authority, are under a basic moral
obligation to respect this general principle: the judiciary ought to act as far as it is
morally and factually possible in a legitimate way. It follows that if Dicey’s descrip-
tion of the rules and principles of constitutional law in the United Kingdom in the
19th century were true, that is, if these rules and principles really had been the
consequence of judicial enforcement against governmental action and decision of
certain basic individual rights and freedoms as defined by judges, then this prac-
tice could be acceptable as morally legitimate in principle. Of course, the actual
practice could not be accepted as legitimate within the ‘General Legitimacy
Thesis’ unless it could be shown that the legitimacy of the action of the Crown and
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its servants was conditioned by at least one fundamental criteria of political legit-
imacy providing that there are things the government cannot do to individuals,
notably violate their basic rights and freedoms. Moreover, it does not matter for
my purposes whether British judges have actually conceived their own legitimacy
within the ‘General Legitimacy Thesis’.67 The normative force of the Diceyan
model of constitutionalism is not a historical or psychological issue. 
The Diceyan model might appear to fit best where political practices embody
unwritten constitutions. However, I see no good reason why it would not be
acceptable where the constitution is written. The general principle of political
morality requiring judges to do what is necessary in order to act, as far as possible,
in legitimate way entails that judges are entitled to verify in any given case whether
the norms they are asked to enforce are valid laws and, the case being, whether
they possess moral legitimacy. For although the norms are valid according to a
written constitution, if they were not morally legitimate, they would not be morally
entitled to judicial enforcement and the judiciary would be morally entitled not to
enforce them. It follows that the written criteria of constitutional validity are not
themselves entitled to judicial enforcement wherever they formally acknowledge
the validity of a norm that is not morally permissible. For a constitutional provi-
sion cannot morally authorize the courts to act in an illegitimate way, and this is
what it would do if it asked them to use as reason for decision an illegitimate law.
Assume, for example, that the written constitution provided that a majority of the
elected representatives can legally do horrible things to one class of citizens and
that the fundamental criteria of political legitimacy provided that legitimate
majoritarian legislation should treat its citizens as equals. A legislative norm doing
horrible things to one class of its citizens in accordance with the constitution would
be both valid and illegitimate. Accordingly, the judiciary would be morally enti-
tled not to enforce this legislative norm (for using it as a reason for decision would
not be acting in a legitimate way) and, consequently, to ignore the written consti-
tutional provision. Of course, the judiciary is not compelled to invalidate the writ-
ten constitutional rule or act as if the Constitution did not exist; it can interpret it
in ways that avoid unacceptable (or illegitimate) results or it can create exceptions
to undesirable constitutional rules.68 In all cases, judicial review of legislation
would be authorized and the interpretation of the written constitution would be
partly determined by a judicial commitment to maintain its own legitimacy.69
Indeed, as I said above, this is entirely consistent with contemporary practice of
judicial review and explains why the basic rules and principles of constitutional law
can be conceived as a consequence of what should be accepted as legitimate 
governmental action or decision. 
The Diceyan model, therefore, can make sense where the constitution is writ-
ten, for the mere fact that a written constitution considers as legally valid a piece
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of legislation does not entail that a judicial decision based upon this law is accept-
able as legitimate. The Marshallian model claims exactly the opposite. According
to the Diceyan model, the Marshallian model could be acceptable in principle if
the whole domain of political legitimacy of legislative and executive actions could
be ultimately reduced to the criteria of legal validity explicitly written in the con-
stitution, whatever governmental institutions are (a Parliament or a dictatorship)
and whatever these institutions are authorized to promote (equality or slavery). It
could be acceptable, in other words, if the issue of political legitimacy somehow
could be reduced to legality. This is precisely what the Marshallian model claims
to have done through the notion of people’s ‘original right’ to establish its own
constitution. But this is not reasonable: from the point of view of political morality
and legitimacy, it matters whether political institutions are democratic or not and
whether a constitutionally valid law promotes equality or slavery, internal security
or warfare. Similarly, it should matter for judges who are committed to maintain
their own legitimacy. Accordingly, a written constitution cannot bar the way to
judicial review of governmental action and decision that are inconsistent with the
relevant normative standards of political legitimacy. 
What I now want to argue is that we have reason to believe, from a normative
point of view, that the Diceyan model makes better sense than the American
model. I do not intend to linger on the normative weaknesses of the American
model. I assume that they are sufficiently known. First, the model postulates that
the people (say through their elected representatives) have a sovereign right to gov-
ern themselves. Yet, it entails that the consent, the will or judgments of past
majorities must prevail over the consent, will or judgment of present-day citizens.
Accordingly, it prevents later people to democratically determine for themselves,
as sovereign, what conception of justice, policies and ends should be promoted for
the good of their own community. This is practically antidemocratic and appar-
ently inconsistent with its basic postulates. 
Secondly, the model postulates that written constitutions embody the whole set
of authoritative constitutional norms that constitute the source of legitimate gov-
ernmental action and decision. Yet, constitutional language is (one might think
‘necessarily’) open textured and does not and cannot contemplate all possible
problems of governance.70 Accordingly, it prevents written constitutions from
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embodying the whole set of authoritative constitutional norms that constitute the
source of legitimate governmental action and decision, such norms being gener-
ally ultimately determined (decided and interpreted) by judges. Once again this is
practically antidemocratic and we have reason to believe that Marshall’s model
cannot live up to its own postulates. 
Thirdly, as I said, this model artificially reduces the whole sphere of political
legitimacy to legality, making it a form of legalism, ultimately justified on the
ground of some ‘original right of the people’. Accordingly, any law established in
accordance with the written constitution should be conceived as morally legit-
imate, even if it is totally unreasonable, arbitrary, unjust, unfair or otherwise inde-
cent or horrible. Any such law must be regarded as morally entitled to judicial
enforcement, even if the norm is totally unreasonable, arbitrary, unjust, unfair or
otherwise indecent or horrible. Finally, any judicial decision that enforces any
such law must be accepted as morally legitimate, even if the norm it enforces is
totally unreasonable, arbitrary, unjust, unfair or otherwise indecent or horrible.
From the point of view of political morality, one might reasonably conclude that
something is rotten in the Marshallian model of constitutionalism.
These weaknesses have probably constituted the main challenges within con-
temporary constitutional scholarship, especially in the United States. Although
there have been various theoretical attempts to correct the Marshallian model, it
has not been admitted yet that any of them has succeeded. I do not intend, how-
ever, to discuss these attempts in this paper.71 I want to argue that the Diceyan
model of constitutionalism does not manifest these weaknesses.
First, it is not necessarily antidemocratic. If democratic theory constitutes the
best normative theory of political legitimacy available, as it is generally admitted
within normative constitutional theory, then the judiciary is entitled to verify
whether the norms they are asked to enforce in a given case are consistent with the
best theory of democratic legitimacy available and, if such norms appear to be
democratically legitimate, to use them as reason for decision. Correlatively, if such
norms appear not to be democratically legitimate, judges are entitled not to
enforce them. Of course, depending on the nature of the normative theory of
democracy actually accepted by the courts, the conditions of democratic legiti-
macy of governmental action and decision could vary. For example, a conception
of democracy coming within majoritarianism may justify judicial enforcement of
laws that could be regarded as illegitimate according to a conception of legitimacy
coming within some complex version of constitutional democracy or deliberative
democracy. Consequently, the nature and content of the basic rules and principles
of the constitution, both unwritten and written, as interpreted and enforced by the
courts, can vary in accordance with the nature of the normative theory of demo-
cracy accepted by the courts. This would not necessarily be antidemocratic for, by
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hypothesis, the basic rules and principles of the constitution recognized by the
courts would institute and maintain democracy as a mode of governance.72
Secondly, the Diceyan model of constitutionalism can live up to its own postu-
lates. It is true that judges, as well as philosophers and citizens, may reasonably 
disagree on the ground, nature and content of the conditions governmental action
and decision must satisfy in order to be accepted by the courts as legitimate and,
consequently, as entitled to judicial enforcement. But reasonable disagreements in
this area cannot invalidate the Diceyan model; for such disagreement should be
seen as one consideration judges must take into account in the process of deter-
mining the conditions governmental action and decision must satisfy in order to
be accepted by the courts as legitimate.73 One cannot merely assume that the fact
of reasonable disagreements necessarily entails that the people as a whole or the
majority of the people (or any body else) are morally entitled to make and unmake
any law they wish, for this assumption constitutes an answer to what is in question,
namely, the normative conditions of political legitimacy, and this answer must be
argued for.74 Moreover, if one maintained a form of moral scepticism or relativism
with respect to the conditions of political legitimacy, one would still have to deter-
mine the non moral conditions governmental action and decision must satisfy in
order to be accepted by the courts as entitled to judicial enforcement. Unless one
accepted to decide such conditions in arbitrary way, the determination would be
supported by a set of non-moral considerations showing why such conditions are
both necessary and sufficient. Such process of reasoning might have something to
do with pragmatism. Insofar as the reasons were practically intelligible, they would
constitute an argument showing the ‘best’ conditions governmental action and
decision must satisfy in order to be accepted by the courts as legitimate.
Consequently, although conceived as non-moral, the argument could be open to
critical assessment and deliberation. 
Thirdly, it does not artificially reduce the whole sphere of political legitimacy to
legality. On the one hand, the Diceyan model of constitutionalism recognizes the
existence of certain normative standards of political legitimacy by virtue of which
the legitimacy of valid legal rules can be assessed. On the other hand, the model
entails that any alleged law inconsistent with these standards of political morality
(legislative and executive acts, for example) or authorizing laws inconsistent with
these standards of political morality (alleged constitutional or statutory norms, for
example) may not be enforceable as a matter of law. Moreover, insofar as totally
unreasonable, arbitrary, unjust, unfair or otherwise indecent or horrible legal
norms were conceived as illegitimate, the judiciary would be morally entitled 
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not to enforce them. To this extent, one may certainly assert that all laws that are
judicially enforced are (conceived as) morally legitimate. But this has nothing to do
with legalism. Finally, judicial decisions that enforce such legitimate laws are
acceptable as morally legitimate.
Consequently, not only the Diceyan model of constitutionalism makes sense
from a normative point of view, but we have reason to believe that it makes better
sense than the Marshallian model. 
F CONCLUSION
In this text, I have contrasted two models of constitutionalism. The first model,
deriving from the main tradition of American constitutionalism, entails that the
basic rules and principles of constitutional law should be conceived as the source of
(what should be accepted as) legitimate governmental action and decision. I have
called it the ‘American’ or the ‘Marshallian’ model. The second model, deriving
from the main tradition of British constitutionalism, entails that the basic rules and
principles of constitutional law should be conceived as the consequence of (what
should be accepted as) legitimate governmental action and decision. I have called
it the ‘British’ or the ‘Diceyan’ model. I have tried to show that we have reasons
to believe that the British or Diceyan model is superior to the American or
Marshallian model, both from a descriptive and from a normative point of view.
If my arguments are accepted, then, normative constitutional theory can and
should move from a reflection on the ‘right’ constitutional interpretive methodol-
ogy (originalism, for example) to a reflection on the substantial and/or procedural
criteria of political legitimacy of legislative and executive action and decision.
Since it can be expected that, within our legal and political tradition, such criteria
would come within democratic theory, constitutional law should develop in accor-
dance with the rules, principles and values that constitute the best normative
theory of democratic legitimacy available. It would also follow that the nature and
content of constitutional norms should not be conceived as the source, but as the
consequence of legitimate governmental action and decision. In any case, we have
good reason to believe that contemporary normative constitutional theory is 
actually moving in this direction. The important body of constitutional literature
conceiving constitutional norms, not as limiting or disabling, but as ‘enabling’
democracy, both supports and is supported by the Diceyan model.75
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